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The Western Balkans integration within the EU has started a legal process which is the rejection of former 
communist legal/political approaches and the transformation of former communist institutions. Indeed, the EU 
agenda has brought vertical/horizontal integration and Europeanization of national institutions (i.e. shifting 
power to the EU institutions and international authorities). At this point, it is very crucial to emphasize the fact 
that the Western Balkans as a whole region has currently an image that includes characteristics of both the 
Soviet socialism and the European democracy. The EU foreign policies and enlargement strategy for Western 
Balkans have significant effects on four core factors (i.e. Schengen visa regulations, remittances, asylum and 
migration as an aggregate process). The convergence/divergence of EU member states’ priorities for migration 
policies regulate and even shape directly the migration dynamics in migrant sender countries. From this 
standpoint, the research explores how main migration factors are influenced by political and judicial factors 
such as; rule of law and democracy score, the economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society 
score and citizenship rights in Western Balkan countries. The proposal of interhybridity explores how the 
hybridization of state and  non-state actors within home and host countries can solve labor migration-related 
problems. Indisputably, hybrid model (i.e. collaboration state and non-state actors) has a catalyst role in terms of 
balancing social problems and civil society needs. Paradigmatically, it is better to perceive the hybrid model as a 
combination of communicative and strategic action that means the reciprocal recognition within the model is 
precondition for significant functionality. This will shape social and industrial relations with moral meanings of 
communication. 
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«Yet it is no exaggeration to say that liberation as an intellectual mission, born in the 
resistance and opposition to the confinements and ravages of imperialism, has now 
shifted from the settled, established, and domesticated dynamics of culture to its 
unhoused, decentered, and exilic energies, energies whose incarnation today is the 
migrant,1 and whose consciousness is that of the intellectual and artist in exile, the 
political figure between domains, between forms, between homes, and between 
languages» 
--- Edward W. Said – Culture and Imperialism, 1993: 332 --- 
he EU started to shape a common migration policy with Maastricht Treaty which ensured a ground to 
structure intergovernmental cooperation. Afterwards, the Amsterdam Treaty put it a step further and 
included migration policies at the Union level (Community Pillar Title IV) and the Schengen Agreement 
into acquis communitaire. In Title V, the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU) has transformed the intergovernmental 
cooperation to transgovernmental cooperation which covers the Union, member states and the third countries. 
Likewise, the TFEU has centralized the power at Union level for more effective migration policies and the 
centralization to Brussels has provided convergence and divergence in various migration issues.
2
 At national 
level, the EU respects all member states’ own constitutions and regulations because all member states have their 
sovereignty rights and some member states which suffer from high migration and asylum flows, are referring to 
their national law and regulations. Accordingly, the EU attaches considerable attention to the bilateral and 
multilateral relations/agreements (e.g. visa policy, cooperation with countries on illegal migration flows and 
back illegal migrant agreements). These relations and agreements are necessary and precondition for regional 
cooperation and enlargement policy.  
T 
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Thus the Western Balkans appears as a strategic region which have high priorities for regional cooperation 
and strategic partnership for the creation of the EU security cycle through becoming more closer to these 
countries. Latterly, the EU has given many rights (i.e. visa liberalizations, social and cultural funds, financial aid 
and so forth) particularly to the Western Balkan countries. Approving Croatia as twenty-eighth EU member 
state, giving candidate status to Serbia, starting visa liberalization talks with Kosovo, helping Albania to achieve 
interparty agreement (government-opposition) and political stability and many other positive outcomes ought to 
be perceived as great successes of the EU efforts. 
From the perspective of free movement of persons and workers as fundamental rights which are guaranteed 
by the EU law, the Schengen regulations bring a paradox regarding migration and asylum issues. The judicial 
complaints, debates and skeptic attitudes in France, Italy, Germany and Spain against migration policies and 
Schengen regulations have illustrated this fact perfectly. In 2009, only these four countries have received 
approximately half of the total Schengen visas (4709491 visas, 49.02 per cent of total visas) in Schengen zone. 
With these facts in mind, for the Western Balkan countries visa liberalizations have provided overstay of 
migrants and asylum applications.  All Western Balkan countries’ (currently except Kosovo) citizens are 
allowed to enter any EU member state without a visa for maximum 90 days and 180 day in a year and they 
move to any member state within this process. Chronically, some matters of free movement lay on the 
circulation within the Schengen zone. To give an instance, immigrants who want to establish their lives with 
their families in France, are not allowed to use Italy as transit country through applying for international 
protection right. Generally, the Schengen states are sending back immigrants to the previous country from where 
they have entered (i.e. first asylum principle). Essentially, the study investigates the fundamental reasons 
through using empirical data and attempts to connect the main migration factors (e.g. visa, remittance, asylum 
and migration) are influenced by political and judicial factors such as; rule of law and democracy score, the 
economic liberation score, political and human rights, civil society score and citizenship rights in Western 
Balkans. In general, the research questions are as follows: 
General Questions Form of Questioning 
1. Have the EU integration process and enlargement agenda significant effect on 
transformation of Industrial Relations and Post-Communist Institutions within Western 
Balkans? 
If yes Why? How?  
2. Have the characteristics of transformation process been shaped in between the Soviet 
Socialism and the European democracy? 
How? To what extend? 
3. Is the role of Constitutional Courts in Western Balkan states significant at 
enhancement of judicial independence and judicial review, level of 
democracy/democratization and rule of law? 
Why? To what extend?  
4. Can voice – entitlement nexus on the one hand, and legitimacy – effectiveness on the 
other be clarified in the context of industrial relations and democracy?3 
How? At which level: national, international 
and/or supranational? 
The research contributes at both the theoretical and empirical levels to the insights of employment 
relationship and comparative political analyses of Western Balkan countries. Specifically, it is important to ask; 
on the one hand how the Western Balkan countries ought to preserve characteristics of Soviet Socialism, and on 
the other, how these sovereign states will keep up doing reforms in political and judiciary area for meeting 
European standards and norms during the Europeanization and EU integration process without causing any 
damage towards the characteristics of Soviet Socialism. The research has focused on the Codebook of the 
Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989 – 2006 (Klaus Armingeon, 
University of Berne), the Comparative Constitutional Project (University of Illinois) and the Judinst Project – 
Assessing Judicial Institutions and Judicial Performances in which I was an intern at Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. According to the scope of these codebooks, 
research hypotheses and empirical techniques have been generated as below.
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1. Elections 
H1 The date of election of national Parliament affects the percentage of votes. 
H2 The president’s term in office has significant effect on mode of electing the president. 
H3 The voter turnout in the parliamentary election influences percentage of votes. 
H4 The number of seats contested in each election affects the percentage of seats. 
H5 
The percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election influences the turnout for presidential 
election. 
2. Post-Communist Institutions 
H6 The political system significantly influences the mode of election of upper chamber. 
H7 The index of rigidity of constitution affects electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament. 
H8 The presidential power index has an effect on popular veto and veto point referendum. 
3. Women in Parliament 
H9 The number of women in Parliament affects the type of cabinet. 
4. Party System 
H10 The effective number of parties in Parliament has an influence on the type of cabinet. 
5. Complexion of Government 
H11 The complexion of government affects the percentage of seats. 
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6. Democracy 
H12 
The democratization score significantly influences the electoral process, civil society, independent media and governance 
scores. 
H13 Rule of Law score has an effect on judicial framework and independence, and corruption scores. 
H14 The democracy score affects the national and local democratic governance scores. 
7. Industrial Relations 
H15 The number of workers involved in labour conflicts has an effect on the unemployment as a percentage of the labour force. 
H16 The constitution has a significant effect on industrial relations. 
[PROVWORK] - Does the constitution mention a state duty to provide work/employment?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine  c. Not Applicable 
[REMUNER] - Does the constitution provide the right to just remuneration, fair or equal payment for work?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[JOINTRDE] - Does the constitution provide for the right to form or to join trade unions?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[STRIKE] - Does the constitution provide for a right to strike?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[LEISURE] - Does the constitution provide for a right of rest and leisure? 
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
[SAFEWORK] - Does the constitution mention the right to safe/healthy working conditions?  
1. Yes; 2. No  
a. other, please specify in the comments section b. Unable to Determine c. Not Applicable 
8. Judiciary 
H17 Verdicts of constitutional courts have significant influence on judicial review and index of rigidity of constitution. 
Gallagher index of disproportionality (Lijphart 1999: 158) 
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The objectives of the research are listed as follows: comparing i) Elections, ii) Post-communist Institutions, iii) 
Women in Parliament, iv) Party System, v) Complexion of Government, vi) Democracy, vii) Industrial Relations 
and viii) Judiciary criteria in Western Balkan countries. The scope of the research in terms of criteria and factors 
are as such: i)Elections (e.g. date of election of national Parliament, voter turnout in the parliamentary election, 
number of seats contested in each election, electoral threshold, percentage of votes, percentage of seats, mode of 
electing the president, president’s term in office, date of election of president, turnout for presidential election, 
percentage of votes obtained by the winning candidate in presidential election), ii)Post-communist Institutions 
(e.g. bicameral or unicameral parliament, subordinated upper chamber, mode of election of upper chamber, form 
of state organization as defined by constitution, judicial review, electoral system for the Parliament, type of 
cabinet, index of rigidity of constitution, required referendum, veto point referendum, popular veto, popular 
initiative and political system), iii)Women in Parliament (e.g. percentage of women in Parliament, number of 
women in Parliament), iv)Party System (e.g. effective number of parties in Parliament, index of 
fractionalization of the party –system), v)Complexion of Government, vi)Democracy (e.g. year of acquisition 
of independence or official end of communist rule, overall status of a country, rating of Political Rights, rating 
of Civil Liberties, Democratization score, Rule of Law score, Economic Liberalization score, rating of press 
freedom scores, Corruption Perception Index, violent conflict inside the country or at the borders), 
vii)Industrial Relations (e.g. number of workers involved in labor conflicts, number of days not worked, 
unemployment as a percentage of the labor force) and viii)Judiciary (e.g. Constitutional Comparisons, 
Constitutional Court and Judicial Review). In this study, the hypotheses of Post-Communist Institutions and 
Democracy were merely taken into account because of the scope of the research. Thus the hypotheses of 
Elections, Women in Parliament, Party System, Complexion of Government, Industrial Relations and Judicial 
framework were excluded. 
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Methodology and Background 
Why the Western Balkan countries were chosen for a comparison analysis? Geographically, the Western 
Balkans, consists of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, FYR Macedonia, Montenegro, and 
Serbia. Croatia was excluded because of achieving a certain date (i.e. mid-2013) for being the twenty-eighth 
member state of the EU. All other Western Balkan states have put the full membership objective as ultimate 
achievement on their national agenda. Thus for the EU the most crucial point is the development process in 
these states and efforts for achieving EU standards. Of course, achieving EU standards is not possible with 
merely national capital and state development plans. The European capital flows and direct investments will 
enhance collaboration with state actors and philanthropic actions with civil society in Western Balkans. 
From international migration point of view, the Western Balkan case is sui generis. The European 
Commission has been published many analytical reports and strategy papers for particularly Western Balkan 
countries. Above all, from the European Union perspective, these two regions have a very high priority for 
pursuing the EU 2020 targets and enhancing the development process both internally in the EU and externally in 
Western Balkans. Agreeably, the distance among the EU and Western Balkans is a factor that distinguishes the 
region from other regions of the world. The EU considers the relationship with the region as both strategy and 
security cycle. Most of migration influxes to the EU come from the countries of this region and that’s why the 
hybrid model proposed is significant and it is supposed to be an effective strategy for the EU enlargement, 
integration, stability, and development processes. 
To support and improve hybrid model, the author has participated in various conferences in European 
Parliament and European Commission such as the conference of Mr. Andrew Rasbash, Head of Unit: 
Institutional building, TAIEX, TWINNING, that was entitled ‘The EU’s Enlargement Policy’ and the 
conference of Mr. Jordi Garcia Martinez, the Policy Officer – Visa Policy, which was entitled ‘The EU’s 
Asylum Policy’. The author has also participated in a conference which is entitled ‘Habermas und der 
Historische Materialismus.’ The conference was organized on 23-25/03/2012 and Emeritus Prof. Dr. Karl-Otto 
Apel (Universität Frankfurt am Main), Emeritus Prof. Dr. Jürgen Habermas (Universität Frankfurt am Main) 
and many other social scientists have participated as speakers and listeners at Bergische Universität Wuppertal 
in Germany. Altogether, the author has applied two cases i.e. Heidelberg Intercultural Center (Heidelberg 
Interkulturelles Zentrum) and ASAN - Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i Studentëve Shqiptarë në 
Botë) to the research. The first case is testing the perception of a migrant receiver country (Germany) and the 
second case is testing the perception of migrant sender country (Albania). The author has carried out an in-depth 
interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of the Foreigners’ & Migrants’ Council in 
Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). The outcomes of the in-depth interview were very significant in 
terms of the EU integration and development processes and explain how hybrid structures just like the 
Heidelberg Intercultural Center as a hybrid case are likely to spread and networked in the future. 
Eventually, the information was mostly collected from the World Bank databases and the European 
Commission published reports in order to analyze each state and region separately and then compare the 
illustrations for finding out similarities and differences among each other.  
Systematically, the study presents the interrelationship among concepts and categories of comparison 
analyses of the case of Western Balkan countries’ data. The first step of migration process is visa applications. 
Many embassies of EU member states in Western Balkan countries have set up new regulations and procedures 
so that migrants or potential migrants in these regions cannot obtain a valid visa because of not meeting the 
eligibility criteria. The evaluation process of visa applications reflects the attitude of EU member states towards 
migrants and gives a clue regarding the degree of the usage of rigid and restrictive visa regulations and 
procedures. If migrants success to obtain a valid visa, then the second step is about the remittances. Even though 
the migrants declare how they will finance themselves in host countries during visa application process, many 
inconvenient matters may occur while they are in host countries or different problems may emerge in home 
countries. Thus inward and outward remittances are the inflexible dynamic factors which directly influence both 
migrants at host countries and their families at home countries or vice versa. The transfer of money amounts 
points out another issue which is obligatory partnership with private banks and institutions. Even public 
institutions at home countries may need to work with private institutions at host countries because of several 
reasons. One of these reasons is the protection of migrants who are living in between home and host countries. 
For instance, migrants who face financial problems are problems of both sides, i.e. home country and host 
country. Therefore, hybridity which will be argued in the fourth section proposes a solution which links home 
and host country with public and private actors, and migrants with civil society. The third step is asylum that 
covers unqualified and low-skilled migrants. Generally, asylum seekers from Western Balkan countries 
temporarily find solutions for working and staying at host countries. The pushing factors at their home 
countries, the high level of competitiveness, restrictive migration and asylum policies at host countries are the 
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essential points which force asylum applicants finding alternative solutions. However, these solutions 
sometimes turn out as illegal forms and damage the image of home country and make the host country change 
the positive attitude towards asylum seekers. In fact, the main reason of negative behaviors of asylum seekers is 
the lack of information sources. Altruistically, hybrid model will ensure various knowledge base online 
platforms for asylum seekers so that they will enhance awareness of opportunities and advantages both at home 
and host countries. The fourth step is more related to international migration because migration as a category 
frames the influxes and dynamics from a broader perspective. With this respect, hybrid model will provide 
strategies, policies and more effective solutions for measurement of migration dynamics and creation of 
collaborations among state, private and civil society in terms of pursuing triple win solutions (home, host 
countries and migrants) via indirect centralization within public sphere and state’s authority to attain the 
ultimate goal. This will be a reflection of global trends because on the one side, in the EU, there is a demand for 
legal migration of high skilled workers and well-educated students and on the other side there is an ideal type 
which is shaped by migrants of Western Balkan countries and symbolizes successes (i.e. achieving 
unimaginable). Profoundly, this combination will strengthen the partnership level among home and host 
countries and will provide some definite solutions for issues such as pensions, bargaining, social dialogue, social 
protection and inclusion, healthcare, job creations, capacity building and so on. 
 
Figure 1: A Range of Methodologies and Their Related Paradigms 
Source: Healy and Perry, 2000:121 
 
Positivism, Constructivism and Case Study Research were followed as paradigmatic research methods. The 
research has a mainstream methodology understanding that means specified three methods were partly engaged 
to the research. Positivism supports a quantitative methodology and generally utilizes a hypothesis approach, 
which is then tested empirically, as the ontological perspective dictates that objective enquiry provides a true 
and predictive knowledge of external reality.  The goal of positivism is scientific explanation whereas the 
purpose of social science is the “understanding of the meaning of social phenomena”. Constructivism, broadly 
conceived, is the thesis that knowledge cannot be a passive reflection of reality, but has to be more of an active 
construction by an agent.  Although this view has its roots in the ideas of Kant, the term was first coined by 
Piaget to denote the process whereby an individual constructs its view of the world. Case Study is an empirical 
inquiry that: investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context when the boundaries between 
the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used.
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Data Overview: Empirical Comparison of Western Balkans 
The outcomes of data comparison of Western Balkan countries are as follows: Serbia has the highest 
international migration stock and percentage of population. Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina follow Serbia with high level of migration stock. Noticeably, percentage of population of 
international migration stock of Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania are relatively high despite the fact that 
these countries have a low population rate comparing with Serbia. Symptomatically, the results of the 
comparison of percentage of population of the stock of immigrants, females as percentage of immigrants and 
percentage of population of the stock of immigrants of Western Balkan countries are as such: Montenegro has 
6 
the highest percentage of population of the stock of immigrants and females as percentage of immigrants. 
Exclusively, Albania has the highest percentage of population of the stock of emigrants. Albania has the highest 
number of migrant stock at home country and Bosnia and Herzegovina has the highest number of migrant stock 
at host country. Comparing inward and outward remittance flows of the Western Balkan countries, the graphs 
illustrate dynamic trends. For example, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have high level of inward and 
outward remittance flows. Albania has the lowest level of outward remittance flows. The World Bank data 
comparison of refugee population by country or territory of asylum
 
of Western Balkan countries indicates 
interesting results. Montenegro and Serbia have the highest refugee population, whereas Albania has the lowest 
refugee population by country or territory of asylum. The World Bank data comparison of refugee population by 
country or territory of origin of Western Balkan countries emphasizes the fact that the Western Balkan region 
has a very high level of refugee population by country or territory of origin. Particularly, Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Albania have the highest refugee population level. Whereas Montenegro has the lowest 
refugee population by country or territory of origin. 
With respect to the illustrations above, researchers may recognize many similarities among Western Balkan 
countries when they especially focus on concepts such as inward and outward remittance flows, refugee 
population by country or territory of asylum, bilateral estimates of migrant stock data at home and host countries 
and so forth. The crucial point for generating a theoretical model in migration research is the generalization of 
concepts as categories. This may provide significant correlations among similarities and differences. 
Numerical results of Western Balkans are as such
7
: During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, 
Albanian net migration (total migration) numbers are as follows: -270245 (2000) -72243 (2005) and -47889 
(2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 523 refugees in 2000 to 76 
refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 6802 refugees 
in 2000 to 14772 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international migration stock: 76695 (2000) 
2.5 per cent of population, 82668 (2005) 2.6 per cent of population and 89106 (2010) 2.8 per cent of population. 
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Macedonian net migration numbers are as such: -9000 
(2000) -4000 (2005) and 2000 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 
9050 refugees in 2000 to 1398 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has 
increased from 2176 refugees in 2000 to 7889 refugees in 2010. There is also an incline at the international 
migration stock: 125665 (2000) 6.3 per cent of population, and 129701 (2010) 6.3 per cent of population. 
During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Montenegro net migration numbers are as follows: -32450 
(2000),       -20632 (2005) and -2508 (2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased 
from 24019 refugees in 2009 to 16364 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of 
origin has increased from 2582 refugees in 2009 to 3246 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the 
international migration stock: 54583 (2005) 8.7 per cent of population, and 42509 (2010) 6.7 per cent of 
population. During 2000-2010 according to the World Bank data, Bosnia and Herzegovina net migration 
numbers are as such: 281795 (2000) 61825 (2005) and -10000 (2010). Refugee population by country or 
territory of asylum has decreased from 38152 refugees in 2000 to 7016 refugees in 2010, and refugee population 
by country of territory of origin has decreased from 474981 refugees in 2000 to 63004 refugees in 2010 as well. 
There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 96001 (2000) 2.6 per cent of population, 35141 
(2005) 0.9 per cent of population, and 27780 (2010) 0.7 per cent of population. During 2000-2010 according to 
the World Bank data, Serbia net migration numbers are as follows: -147889 (2000) -338544 (2005) and 0 
(2010). Refugee population by country or territory of asylum has decreased from 484391 refugees in 2000 to 
73608 refugees in 2010, whereas refugee population by country of territory of origin has increased from 146748 
refugees in 2000 to 183289 refugees in 2010. There is also a decline at the international migration stock: 856763 
(2000) 11 per cent of population, 674612 (2005) 9 per cent of population, and 525388 (2010) 7 per cent of 
population. Axiomatically, migration flows from Western Balkan to the EU have also economic consequences 
and dimensions. Incrementally, in Albania, there is an increase at both inward remittance flows and outward 
remittance flows. In 2003, the inward remittance flows is $889 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows 
reached $1.3 billion. Comparably, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $4 million, and in 2009 the outward 
remittance flows reached $10 million. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is 
$1749 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $2.2 billion. Respectively, in 2003, the outward 
remittance flows is $20 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance flows reached $61 million. In Macedonia, 
in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $174 million, and in 2009 the inward remittance flows reached $401 
million. Rhythmically, in 2003, the outward remittance flows is $16 million, and in 2009 the outward remittance 
flows reached $26 million. In Serbia, in 2003, the inward remittance flows is $2.7 billion, and in 2009 the 
inward remittance flows reached $5.4 billion. However, there is a decline at outward remittance flows from 
$138 million in 2008 to $91 million in 2009. Another economic consequence of migration flows is workers’ 
remittances: in 2009, Albania received $1.1 billion worth of remittances per year, Bosnia and Herzegovina $1.4 
billion, FYR Macedonia $260 million and Serbia $3.8 billion. 
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Empirical results also illustrate another aspect of immigration from Western Balkan to the EU. Feminization 
of migration policies is very crucial because the empirical results highlight the fact that a high percentage of 
immigrants stock in 2010 are females. In Albania, 53.1 per cent, in Bosnia and Herzegovina 50.3 per cent, in 
Macedonia 58.3 per cent, in Montenegro 61.5 per cent and in Serbia 56.7 per cent of immigrants are females.  
Adhering to the data given above, from gender perspective, at national level states must regulate specific 
immigration regulations for protection of female immigrants and ensure fair and anti-discriminative solutions. 
At supranational level, the European Commission should amend immigration regulations with a guarantee of 
full protection of female migrants’ rights. No doubt, feminization of migration is an important factor for 
demographic change in the EU and might be a perfect solution for ageing population of the EU. Feminization of 
migration has also another significant effect on family reunifications and fits in the dialectics of triple win and 
hybrid model. 
 
Table 1: The EU Financial Allocations for Western Balkan Countries 
Western Balkan Countries Multiannual Indicative 
Financial Framework 
Albania (2011-2013) €228.82 
BiH (2011-2013) €328.7 
Kosovo (2011-2013) €212.4 
Macedonia (2011-2013) €320.3 
Montenegro (2011-2013) €104.9 
Serbia (2011-2013) €622.3 
Total Amount €1.81 billion 
Comparably, the total amount of the EU financial allocations for Western Balkans is a bit higher when the 
allocations are considered at population base (Western Balkans total population: 18.66 million). To be sure, this 
evidence illustrates at which level the EU cogitates Western Balkans.
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The Genesis of Hybridity Notion in Social Sciences 
Sociologists argued hybridity as an indispensable collaboration and voluntary or strategic efforts of state, 
private actors and non-profit organizations. Anheier examined quasi-nongovernmental hybrid forms and the 
relation between the public sphere and the voluntary sector in Germany. He found out that the public sphere is 
institutionally embedded between state and society and located among the decentralized public sector and the 
centralizing tendencies in civic society.
8
 In this respect, the third sector which essentially has characteristics of 
heterogeneity and pluralism rather than homogeneity and isomorphism was argued for engagement in between 
public and private dichotomy. Accordingly, intermediary zone between the state and the market covers an 
ambivalent political atmosphere, a political economy of interest mediation and organizational sociology. Thus, 
hybridity as appeared in sociological research area, paradoxically, relied on confrontations with difficulties that 
occur among Government Organizations (GOs), Private Nonprofit Organizations (NPOs) and Private Market 
Organizations (PMOs). 
Hybridity lies behind the understanding of third way approach. ‘The Third Way’ was argued by many 
remarkable scientists, politicians and authors.
9
 The third way has various meanings such as ‘new progressivism’ 
for the American Democrats, ‘new labor’ for the Labor Party in Britain, a mainstream left or central left, a left-
right rationalization, political environmentalism for Al Gore, the modernizing left or modernizing social 
democracy as Giddens-Blair concept, the structural pluralism in terms of the theory of structuration of Giddens. 
What differs the hybrid model from the third way idea is that the hybrid model seeks for approaching 
governance equilibrium in terms of the interest of state, economy and civil society from a broader perspective. 
Whereas, the third way idea looks more into political doctrines to create better political rhetoric for political 
actors of center left. Thus, the third way approach has a disequilibrium between theory and practice. It explains 
how the ideal policies ought to be, however, in practice it is vague that to which issues it provides solutions in 
real terms. On the other hand, Jordan raised his critics of the third way through looking to international financial 
crisis and Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, and he considered the third way as failure because of being 
unsuccessful at regulating morality in economic and social relations. Jordan included the big ‘conservative’ 
society thesis which is a recent debate in UK to his analyses. As a contestation to the third way approach, big 
society idea is nothing more than an attempt to strengthen and encourage the position and active participation of 
churches and religious actors. Big society thesis reflects a decentralization process from central government to 
local governments and then enforces religious institutions at local level. The hybrid model that this study argues 
is something more than this picture. Ideally, hybridity looks into various communities, associations, unions and 
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organizations to form an engaged and networked society. Indeed, it tries to shape a hybrid society, not a big 
society. Thus, this study frankly opposes big society thesis. Of course, the role and influence of churches at 
increasing tendencies and voluntary actions of societies are indispensable however not at adequate level for 
dealing with social issues. 
Giddens created a triangle which can be accepted in the context of general/real hybrid model, i.e. finance, 
manufacture and knowledge. He emphasized the fact that knowledge has become a driving force of productivity 
and expanding financial markets. Thus, he encourages governments to invest on strengthening foundations of 
knowledge base society. 
Habermas involved to hybridity debate however he strongly stressed the partnership with the leadership and 
central authority of state. He stated that the fundamental rights are effective for offering for participation with 
equal opportunity in the process of production and the interplay of a commercial society or a triple function of 
the fundamental rights is legitimized by the fact that in an industrially advanced society private autonomy can be 
maintained and assured only as the derivative of a total political organization.
10
 Naively, Habermas preferred to 
construct the relations between state and civil society from Marxist point of view and put forward 
argumentations that take into account the world’s multidimensional transformation process. 
With respect to this great transformation, multilateralism, regionalization and multipolarity caused emerging 
of new regional powers in the world. Monopoly powers are by inches oligopolized and this situation has 
balanced global powers because of the rising competitiveness level at both international and transnational level, 
and therefore the hybrids in various countries are proliferating. Moreover, the economic power shift from the 
western countries to BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and East Asia and Pacific countries 
has prepared a base for the rise of Hybrid Model. The rise of middle classes and Small-Medium-size Enterprises 
(SMEs) in these countries is a good evidence for effective hybridization via national private actors in modern 
nation states.
11
 Hybridity has various dimensions; such as political hybridity (e.g. hybridity in governance 
model), economic hybridity (e.g. hybridity in political economy), cultural hybridity (e.g. hybrid identities), 
judicial hybridity (e.g. hybridity in legal systems), environmental and social hybridity (e.g. ISO 14000 and ISO 
26000), biological hybridity (Darwin’s hybridism approach) and so forth.12 
In the light of these considerations, supposedly, with creation of hybrid model within state structure at 
national level or within the EU structure at supranational level interhybridity as the main effect of controlling 
migration approach is possible because ideal hybrid types will work for the beneficiaries of both state and non-
state parts with taking into account ‘migration driving forces’ such as remittances, labor policy (wages, 
employment and so forth), economic and political motives, symmetric and asymmetric networks. The European 
Commission has created at implementing decision which supports a greater role for non-state actors through a 
partnership with societies, helping non-state actors develop their advocacy capacity, the ability to monitor 
reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. The Commission has established a ‘Civil 
Society Facility’ to provide funding for non-state actors. The objective of the Facility is to strengthen and 
promote the role of non-state actors in reforms and democratic transformations through increased participation 
in the fulfillment of Neighborhood Policy objectives. 
Considering clarifications above, interhybridity is not possible with using only hard law of states towards 
migrants. Conversely, using hard law for managing migration and asylum issues may cause an incline at illegal 
migration flows. It ought to be noted that preventing illegal migration covers alternative patterns that are in 
favor of migrants. The attempts to control the migration flows with hard law instruments may cause an increase 
in the number of illegal migration and cooperation of migrants with illegal networks. Interhybridity is an open 
debate for scholars. Castles argued that a general theory of migration is neither possible nor desirable. 
Hypothetically, researchers can make significant progress by re-embedding migration research in a more general 
understanding of contemporary society, and linking it to broader theories of social change across a range of 
social scientific disciplines.
13
 
Habermas argued that developing the idea of theory of society conceived with a practical intention. He 
proposed historical materialism which embraces the interrelationships of the theory’s own origins and 
application. He classified three aspects of the relation between theory and praxis: empirical, epistemological, 
and methodological aspects. Excellently, Habermas stated that: ‘Political theory cannot aim at instructing the 
state what it should be like, but rather instead how the state – the moral universal – should be known.’ 
Therefore, a convergence of the two systems on the middle ground of a controlled mass democracy within the 
welfare state is not to be excluded. 
In the light of theory and practice understanding, two examples can help us to measure how hybridity may 
work in EU, Western Balkan countries. The first example is a hybrid project in Heidelberg (Germany). The 
author of this article has carried out an in-depth interview with Mr. Michael Mwa Allimadi who is the head of 
the Foreigners’ & Migrants’ Council in Heidelberg (Ausländerrats / Migrationsrats). Heidelberg Intercultural 
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Center (Heidelberg Interkulturelles Zentrum) is currently a general/real hybrid project which is a common 
platform for state, private and civil society. It has been established in April (2012) and the main purpose is to 
include other non-state actors to this platform in order to deal with migrants’ integration problems, society needs 
and many other issues which are waiting for immediate solutions. During the interview, Mr. Allimadi perfectly 
enlightened me regarding the passion of the people who work in Citizen Department (Bürgeramt) and volunteers 
who participate in the project from various institutions. The project likelihood has the potential to create a 
transition from general/real hybrid project to specific/ideal hybrid project. Mr. Allimadi shared with me the 
project’s motto that is ‘problems are potentials.’ This is a very crucial point because hybridity has state and non-
state actors and each actor has its own problem. This means with coming together problems of some actors will 
be transformed as potentials or opportunities for other actors. This puts indirect centralization and social 
transformation in a consensus of hybrid platform together. Togetherness, openness and solidarity are three 
principles of this harmony. Idiomatically, Mr. Allimadi stated that ‘if you open your door to others, then you 
begin to live in a huge house (He referred to an African proverb).’ The author of this article is currently 
preparing a similar hybrid project for Western Balkan countries’ institutions for benchmarking, embedding and 
proliferating hybridity. The other hybrid project is ASAN Albanian Students Abroad Network (Rrjeti i 
Studentëve Shqiptarë në Botë). The aim of the ASAN project is to increase engagement and integration of 
Albanian young generation who live, study and/or work abroad. ASAN network will be a hybrid network of 
young people at home country and host country. ASAN project participants have created an online database 
(www.asan.al) and rapidly increased capacity of the network. Just like the Heidelberg Intercultural Center, 
ASAN project will deal with internal and external integration issues as well. Currently, ASAN project has a 
general/real hybrid model image, however increasing patriotism trend of Albanians, the willingness level and 
incline of participation level will shift this image to specific/ideal hybrid model. Namely, objectives of the 
project are listed as such: benefit from intellectual property and energy of young ethnic Albanians; take the 
future of Albania under control; creation and coordination of youth Albanian Lobbies; increase the influence of 
national Albanian identity; establish a national online database system; provide internships and job opportunities 
for Albanian migrants; increase Albanians’ representation in world affairs; unify state and non-state actors in a 
common platform; balance employment demand-supply of state and private sector; and unify Albanian youth 
with their diversities. 
 
Socio-political Analyses of Western Balkan Countries 
Hans Kelsen (1955) investigated Socialist Law Legal System, Soviet Political Structures and various 
interpretations and approaches to the Socialist Law of State. These interpretations influenced the Western 
Balkan countries that were a part of Soviet Union.
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 However, after the collapse of the Soviet Union the legal 
superstructure and sovereignty of these states were overwhelmingly damaged. In this context, the research has 
examined how European Industrial Relations and Post-Communist Institutions in Western Balkans have been 
transformed in frame of EU integration process and enlargement agenda. Undoubtedly, industrial relations and 
employment relationship (i.e. the relationship between employees, employee representatives, employers and 
nation-states) are very important factors. Especially, the Western Balkans will be investigated in order to find 
out whether the EU integration process and EU Legal Structure (e.g. the Lisbon Treaty “TFEU” the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and the acquis communautaire) for Western Balkans have significant effects on Balkan 
states’ transition to the European Social Model; such as, social dialogue, tripartite and bipartite information 
exchange and consultation, collective bargaining and legal provisions regarding employment conditions and 
social protection. In general, the research is in a tight manner bound on the criteria and factors of the 
Comparative Data Set (SPSS DATA 2006) for 28 Post-Communist Countries 1989 – 2006, is a collection of 
political and institutional data which has been assembled in the context of the research project “Forms of 
Government. A Comparative Data Set for 28 Eastern Countries” directed by Klaus Armingeon (University of 
Berne) and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
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Table 2: Constitutional Courts of Western Balkans 
Country Website 
The Constitutional Court of Albania (Gjykata Kushtetuese e Shqipërisë) http://www.gjk.gov.al/  
The Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine) http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/  
The Constitutional Court of Kosovo (Gjykata Kushtetuese e Kosovës) http://www.gjk-ks.org/?cid=2,1  
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia (УСТАВЕН СУД НА 
РЕПУБЛИКА МАКЕДОНИЈА) 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.mk/domino/WEBSUD.nsf  
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Montenegro (Ustavni sud Crne Gore) http://www.ustavnisudcg.co.me/engleska/aktuelnostie.htm  
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia (Уставни суд Републике Србије) http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/home/en-GB  
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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In essence, the role of the constitutional courts in Western Balkan states will be examined at the end of the 
research with taking into account judicial independence of states and judicial review process in order to better 
reflect the impact of the Europeanization and harmonization process on legal structures, jurisdictions, 
democratization, rule of law and legalization. 
 
Approaching a Multidimensional Empirical Framework of Interhybridity 
Many mathematical, economical, advanced empirical studies have influenced significantly the insights of 
migration.
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 An economical and sociopolitical migration model is overlapping with the multidimensional 
empirical framework of interhybridity. The economy starts with L native individuals, M migrants and a special 
resource, K = ∑    i  which is the sum of individual holdings of resources. This resource is used for training a 
part of the native population (L) that is willing to join the skilled labor market (L1). The rest of the native 
population (L2) and M comprise the unskilled labor force or 
L2' = L2 + M 
The country produces a good Q using both skilled and unskilled labor L1 and L2'. 
The skilled and unskilled workers are q-complements in the sense that the marginal productivity of the skilled 
workers rises with the amount of the unskilled workers. In the skilled workers' market there is full employment 
(L1=E1), but in the unskilled workers' market there is unemployment, i.e., 
 
L1 = E1 
L2' = E2' + U2' 
where L2'  is the total number of unskilled workers, and E2'(U2') is the number of employed/unemployed 
workers in the unskilled labor market. 
Q = Q(E1, E2') 
 
Each individual likes to consume goods and each native individual, i, in the economy has  
share of this special input where PK is the given price at which K can be marketed. 
The utility function is given by 
V = V(Q) 
 
The unemployment in the unskilled workers' market results from a wage higher than the market clearing wage 
in the unskilled labor market. This above-equilibrium wage is the result of bargaining between the unions and 
the employers. In their effort to maximize income from the labor market, unions propose a nominal wage W2 in 
the unskilled workers' market. In addition to the nominal wage for the unskilled workers, the unions also bargain 
for some additional nonwage benefits, the money value of which equals θ. This is a payment for training to 
acquire more skill. This is bargained because unions are aware that for the majority of the native unskilled 
workers, PKKi is too small to accommodate training cost. The employed unskilled native workers would now 
have 
PKKi + θ = ϕi 
 
to finance the training if they want to join the skilled workers' market (unskilled migrant workers don't have 
PKKi). For the employed native unskilled workers the cost of acquiring skill, Cs, (for a given PKKi) is dependent 
on ϕi and thus on θ; then 
 
 
 
 
The employed unskilled native workers would decide to join the skilled workers' market if the net discounted 
expected utility stream with a discount rate r(>0) is higher for that market. The discounted expected utility 
stream for an employed native unskilled worker is given by rV2=(W2+ PKKi)/P where P is the price level and 
rV2 shows the return on assets in the unskilled native labormarket,which is just equal to current utility. The 
discounted expected utility fromthe skilled labor market is given as rV1={(W1+ PKKi)/P−c(ϕ)} where c(ϕ) is the 
cost per period when C(ϕ) is distributed over the entire working period. A native worker would be indifferent 
between these two markets when V1=V2. So given the distribution of the capital resource, given W1 and the 
choices for W2 and θ, therewill be an equilibriumlevel of ϕ i.e. ϕ
~ 
for which V1=V2. The total number of 
participants/employed workers in the skilled workers' market is given by 
 
 
 
 
where is the proportion of native unskilled workers at a 
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given θ and would give the proportion of the native population willing to be in the skilled  
workers' market. If the union opts for a bigger θ, ϕi goes up and f(ϕ) moves downward or to the right and L2 
becomes smaller. Thus, the total number of workers in the unskilled native labor market given by 
L – E1 = L2 
 
 
goes down and 
L2 – E2 = U2 also goes down 
where E2(U2) is the employed (unemployed) native unskilled worker. The money value of the total amount 
negotiated by the unions for unskilled workers is written as 
 
 
 
Employers choose the level of employment, E2, once unions choose W2 and θ. The total amount bargained could 
have been just the nominal wage if the unions did not want to go for the benefits for acquiring more skill. For a 
chosen level of θ, W2 and a settled wage, W1, in the skilled workers' market, E2′ is determined such that 
W2=PQG2(E2′;E1,θ) and W1=PQG1(E2′(E1,W2,θ),E1) where PQ is the given price of the good. This follows from 
the assumption that the country is small enough to have any effect on prices. For the sake of simplicity it is also 
assumed that the immigrants have no effects on demand. Note that Gi,i=1,2 is the marginal product of the 
respective workers. Unions' bargaining usually involves both skilled and unskilled workers. They are concerned 
about the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers in the economy, wages of both types of workers, the 
unemployment level in the unskilled labor market and the effects of migration on the labor market in general, 
especially on the unemployment rate. The unions are also aware of the distortion created by bargaining. For the 
purpose of this model, however, it is assumed that unions do not directly bargain for skilled workers' wages. It is 
generally believed that European unemployment is mainly a problem of the unskilled labor. In other words, 
since there is no threat of a huge supply of unemployed skilled workers to push the wage down in the skilled 
labor market, unions' bargaining about wages is focused on the unskilled workers' market. This argument stands 
in line with the fact that unions are less able to influence the skilled labor market outcome in Europe, although 
they take skilled labor's interest into consideration while bargaining for the unskilled workers. Thus with 
existing migrants, the labor market in the economy can be described as follows. The total population  
 
 
where L is the total supply of native workers, M is the number of migrants in the total population, E1 is the 
number of skilled workers L2′ is the total (native and migrant) number of unskilled workers E2′ is the total 
(native and migrant) number of employed unskilled workers U2′  is the total number (native and migrant) of 
unemployed, E2 is the number of employed unskilled native workers, where EM is the number of employed 
unskilled migrants, U2 is the unemployed native workers and UM is the unemployed migrant workers. The 
employment share of each type of unskilled workers is assumed to be determined by their respective sizes in the 
total unskilled labor force;  
i.e.  is the employment share of native unskilled workers and γE2′ is the number of employed native 
unskilled workers. 
M = EM + UM 
With information about how the unskilled workers decide to join a particular labor market, the union will 
choose a particular combination of W2 and θ to maximize the total earned income (wage and nonwage). The 
effect of the choice of W2 and θ can be derived from the first order condition of unions' income maximization 
behavior. Unions, interested in the maximization of total labor market income for native workers, will maximize 
 
 
 
with respect to W2 and θ subject to the constraints 
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where λ  the weight attached to skilled workers' market in union decision making; τ1  tax on skilled workers' 
income; τ2  tax on unskilled workers' income; γ  proportion of native workers in total unskilled workers and also 
this proportion of total employed unskilled workers is native; b  unemployment benefit and α  weight for the 
unemployment of natives in union decision making. 
The first term presents the wage bill from the skilled workers' market. The wage bill of the unskilled resident 
workers' market is presented by the second term. And the third term shows that the national union is likely to 
internalize the effects of union's action on the level of unemployment of the native unskilled workers. Note that 
although unions are not bargaining for the skilled workers, they may take skilled workers' economic condition 
into consideration.  
First order conditions are presented by 
 
 
 
 
Thus, to summarize, equations above solve for unknownsW2, θ, ϕ, W2
¯
, Cs, E1, L1, L2, E2, E2′, V, EM, L2′, U2′, U2, 
UM, Q, γ and YL given L, M, L
–
, K, PQ, PK, W1, λ, τ1, τ2, b, and α. It is assumed that i) this is a small country with 
given prices, ii) immigrants have no impact on demand, iii) skilled and unskilled workers are q-complements 
(the latter raises the productivity of the skilled workers), iv) unions don't bargain for skilled workers' wage but 
they take into consideration skilled/unskilled labor ratio, unemployment and non-wage benefit, v) skilled market 
has full employment and unskilled market has unemployment because the bargained wage is greater than the 
market equilibrium wage., vi) all skilled workers are natives. Migrants don't bring any capital with them to be 
trained and vii) migration is caused by expected wage difference. The optimal combination of W2 and θ will be 
the one where the marginal gain from W2 equals the marginal gain from θ. For an interior solution, skilled 
workers will earn more than unskilled workers and unskilled workers will feel better being employed than 
unemployed; b≤(1−τ2)W2≤(1−τ1)W1. The weights, λ, α, taxes, τ1, τ2, and technology will decide whether the 
wage should be chosen on the elastic or the inelastic part (the second order condition is verified. After unions fix 
W2
–
 (=W2+θ), employers decide on the employment level. Thus W2 and θ enter as arguments in the E2′ function. 
Since the productivity of E1 increases with the size of E2′, the size of E1 becomes a deciding factor in the 
demand for unskilled workers. Thus θ affects E2′ both directly and indirectly. 
 
 
 
Keeping W2 constant 
 
 
 
The first term is the usual effect of an increase in the cost of hiring workers. This will have a negative impact, 
reducing the demand for unskilled workers. The non-wage benefit θ (skill training cost) actually helps workers 
move to the skilled workers' market. The second term shows the increase in demand for E2′ because vacancies 
will be created when a number of unskilled workers move to the skilled labor market. When the number of 
skilled workers increases, to maintain the productivity of the skilled workers at the previous level (i.e., dW1=0) 
there will be an additional demand for unskilled workers (because E1 and E2′ are q-complements). This positive 
effect is shown by the third term. The last two terms thus generate favorable effects for employment of unskilled 
workers. If the elasticity of the marginal product of the unskilled labor curve is not very high, as a result of an 
upward change in θ the employment of unskilled workers will go up i.e., ∂ E2′ / ∂ θ > 0.  
Eq. (18) suggests that if unions are interested only in the employed unskilled native workers' market (i.e., 
λ=α=0) and want to raise wage, the absolute value of the elasticity of demand for labor will have to be bigger 
than one to support a positive unemployment benefit (i.e., since b has to be positive to be meaningful, it can 
only be supported by e>1). The existence of high unemployment benefit encourages unions to choose a wage on 
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the elastic part of labor demand curve and thus wages and unemployment will be higher, higher is the 
unemployment benefit. Any increase in non-wage benefits will on the other hand have a positive effect on the 
wage bill as shown by Eq. (19) (because of the favorable effects on dE2′), provided the elasticity of demand for 
unskilled labor is not very high. It is important to note that the negative effect on employment from higher wage 
demand may be offset by the positive employment effect from higher non-wage benefits. This stands in contrast 
to other analyses in the literature. where any higher wage demand increases unemployment. In those analyses, if 
unions are concerned about unemployment, the negotiated wage will be driven to a relatively inelastic part of 
the labor demand curve compared to the situation when unions are not concerned about unemployment (i.e., 
α=0). In this paper's analysis even when unions are concerned about unemployment they can bargain for an 
increase in wages and still can generate a favorable employment effect for native unskilled workers through 
their choice of θ. However, practicing restraints on increased money wage demands will be an additional tool to 
deal with unemployment. in the case when unions deal only with wage compensation, i.e., W2, they will be 
eager to lower wage benefits if they are interested in all three parts (skilled workers' market, unskilled workers' 
market, and unemployment pool) of the labor market but the labor demand is elastic and skilled and unskilled 
workers are complements. In this paper's model under the same scenario (i.e., labor demand is elastic and skilled 
and unskilled workers are complement and unions pays attention to the skilled wage bill, unskilled wage bill and 
unemployment) unions can afford not to change the wage demand at all or to change the money wage by a small 
amount and go for a higher non-wage benefit to maximize the total labor market income. However, to take 
better care of unemployment pool and/or skilled labor market, unions will prefer to be on the relatively inelastic 
part of the labor demand curve or to reduce the money wage. 
Migration in this paper is caused by the expected wage (actual wage times the probability of employment) 
difference. A vast majority of the immigrants to western European countries are unskilled workers. Thus they 
affect the unskilled native workers' market directly. The quantity of immigrants is decided by the government 
control or quota of immigration. In this section we will find out how immigration affects the equilibrium 
solution. Following immigration γ goes down. As a result, the marginal gain from both W2 and θ decline. The 
relative gain or loss will depend on the existing elasticity of labor demand. This suggests that in their 
negotiation, the labor union may choose a different combination of W2 and θ following migration. They may not 
change the nominal wage at all; instead unions may try for a reasonable increase in the training cost benefits. It 
was shown in the previous section that when more unskilled employed workers opt for training, the total number 
of skilled workers goes up. This has two-fold effects on the unskilled labor market: i) it directly creates 
vacancies in the unskilled labor market; and ii) the newly trained skilled workers need unskilled workers to 
boost up the productivity in the skilled workers' market (indirect effect). Also there will be direct negative 
effects from raising θ. However, the direct and indirect effects together raise the employment of unskilled 
workers by offsetting the negative effect. Consequently, unemployment goes own. By totally differentiating the 
first order conditions we see that dθ / dM will be positive and dW2 / dM may take either positive or negative 
depending on the values of the second derivatives or the rates at which the change in employment is affected by 
changes in θ and W2 However, dW2 / dM<dθ / dM. The effects of a reduced γ following immigration will lead to 
a new combination of W2 and θ where favorable effect of increasing θ offsets other unfavorable effects. 
 
These effects are shown in Propositions 1–4 where immigrants do not bring capital with them. 
 
Proposition 1: An increase in immigration increases the size of the skilled labor market. 
 
Proof: To start with E1 has already been determined by W1 and only θ can affect E1. Note that only native 
unskilled workers can move to the skilled workers' market because they enjoy the privilege of having different 
values of initial asset, PKKi. The non-wage benefit, θ, together with PKKi will give the native workers an edge in 
getting training compared to immigrant unskilled workers. 
 
 
 
f(ϕ)=f(ϕ0)=f(PKKi) = proportion of people having different values of PKKi or ϕ0 when θ=0 (initially). 
f(ϕ)=f(ϕ0)−aθ = proportion of people having different values of ϕ when θ>0 and a>0 (note that an increase in θ 
helps to reduce the size of the unskilled labor market or f(ϕ) curve moves rightward or downward or f(ϕ) for 
θ=0>f(ϕ) for θ>0). In that case, dϕ~ =dθ. Thus 
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Proposition 2: An increase in immigration reduces unemployment of native workers. 
 
Proof: 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
 
 
The union would opt for a different combination of W and θ when this new combination would have a favorable 
effect. Total supply of native unskilled workers is written as L2=L−L. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proposition 3: An increase in immigration increases the skill composition of the labor market for the native 
workers. 
 
Proof: 
 
 
 
Thus, following immigration not only does the level of unemployment goes down, but the number of skilled 
workers and the ratio of skilled to unskilled workers go up. 
 
Proposition 4: An increase in immigration increases national income and native workers' share in the national 
income. 
 
Proof: The share of native workers income in the national income is given by W1E1+W2E2. It will go up as 
W1dE1+W2dE2+E2dW2 is positive when E2=γE2′. Following immigration E2′ rises and γ goes down when 
E2′=E2+EM and dE2′ =dE2, because dEM=0. The rise in E2 offsets the effect of a fall in γ. This increase in native 
workers' share in national income will be observed even when union opts for no changes in W2 i.e., dW2=0. 
Thus, 
 
 
 
The above analysis is done while focusing just on the resident workers' market. 
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Let's now assume that both native and migrant employed unskilled workers have equal chances of being trained 
and employed. It implies that the migrants may move with some amount of special resource, K and it replaces 
the assumption that immigrants could not bring any capital with them. Under the scenario immigration will 
again result in a different combination of W2 and θ; however, this reshuffling will affect the labor market 
through L
–
(not just L). Propositions 1′–3′ describe the effects when immigrants arrive with some amount of 
capital. 
 
Proposition 1′: An increase in immigration will increase the size of the skilled workers' market. 
 
Proof: The size of skilled workers' market here is given by 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since, 
 
 
 
Proposition 2′: An increase in immigration will decrease the size of the unskilled workers' market. 
 
Proof: 
 
 
 
Proposition 3′: An increase in immigration will increase the skill composition of the labor force. 
 
Proof: 
 
 
 
It is, however, interesting to note that unions' reaction to an increase in L
–
 following an increase in domestic 
unskilled labor supply may not increase the skill composition of the work force, i.e., dE1′ = dL2 and d(E1′ / L2′) / 
dL2 may decrease. The intuition behind this result says that as share of native unskilled workers in the total 
unskilled workers increases, native workers' income goes up via γ. Consequently, unions may not want to 
increase θ.  Does this provision of non-wage benefit give any new insights in dealing with the problems of 
unemployment that is exacerbated by immigration influx? In analyzing unions' response to immigration, many 
Scholars have shown that unions' reaction depends on whether unions are interested in only native unskilled 
workers' market (pure wage bill maximization for native unskilled workers) or in unskilled workers' market as a 
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whole (including unemployment of unskilled migrant workers) or in both skilled and unskilled workers' market. 
In their analysis for pure wage bill maximization (i.e., only in employed unskilled native workers' market), 
unions will have to be on that part of the demand curve where the value of the elasticity of the labor demand 
curve is greater than one. In other two cases (i.e. when unions pay attention to unemployment or to the skilled 
workers' market), unions might prefer to be on relatively inelastic part. Since bargaining over money wages is 
not the only choice in this paper, unions may accomplish their objective on any part of the labor demand curve 
by negotiating only for non-money wage benefits and keeping the money wage fixed. Of course, employment 
will increase more if labor demand is relatively inelastic. Thus, the introduction of the non-wage benefit brings 
in an element of flexibility that may benefit unions, employers and the government. The analysis in this paper 
suggests that as a result of migration when the marginal gain from bargaining for money wage goes down, 
unions have the option of switching their effort to change the non-wage benefit. In fact, in this paper irrespective 
of (assumptions about)whether unions want to focus on only unskilled labor market or on both skilled and 
unskilled labor market, the negotiation about non-wage benefit will have a positive effect. For the purpose of 
maximizing the total wage bill, it is better if we allow the unions to include all three parts of the labor market 
(skilled labor market, unskilled labor market unskilled unemployed labor pool). 
As it is mentioned before, in European Union countries, the governments cannot affect the wages or 
employment levels directly because of the institutional factors. Unions and the employers decide on the wages 
and employment levels through bargaining. The governments are engaged in transfer payment through taxation 
and unemployment benefits. Thus, the government can only control the factors that indirectly affect unions' and 
employers' decisions. In a situation when migration act as a ‘competitive fringe’ in the sense that as a result of 
migration, unions follows a wage restraints policy, the governments (especially the left-wing governments who 
don't want to use anti-union policy openly) can use migration as a hidden ‘anti-union’ policy. However, in this 
paper's model where unions can use non-wage benefits, migration does not need to be used as an anti-union 
policy. The government can change the anti-migration or anti-union environment by encouraging bargaining 
about non-wage benefits. Noticing that unions' policy has a favorable impact on unemployment, the government 
might come up with some incentives for the employers to settle for a higher θ than what the employers would 
have agreed to otherwise. Employers also might feel encouraged if they don't need to provide for additional 
wage compensation. The government can afford to do this because the total government expenditure on transfer 
payment goes down and tax revenue increases as employment increases following a successful bargaining for a 
higher θ. In that case, the bargaining power of the unions is not weakened in the presence of immigration influx. 
The government's budget is given by  
 
 
when B = total budget and immigrants can't join the  skilled workers' market. Immigration of unskilled workers 
can affect B if immigration has any effects on or wages. 
 
 
 
where M = total number of migrants. If unions decide not to change wage benefit at all i.e., (dW2 / dM) = 0, as 
long as the effect of the first and the second terms exceeds that of the last term in this equation, the government 
will not resort to any antiunion policy. If both wages and non-wage benefits are changed, the first three terms 
need to exceed the last term for the government not to use any anti-union policy. However, if  
 
 
 
 
(on the highly elastic part of the labor demand curve where migration would act as a competitive fringe) the 
government's migration policy may reflect an anti-union agenda. Immigration, unemployment and their 
interrelation not only challenge the labor market of European Union, but they also demand attention for a better 
performance of the Union economy as a whole. The common perception is that the immigration makes the 
unemployment situation worse for the native workers. Scholars have argued that the presence of dominant labor 
unions together with immigration makes European unemployment problem worse than that in the US. Since 
migration can only be controlled by the government, it (especially the left-wing government) can use 
immigration as a covert anti-union policy when immigration acts as a competitive fringe. The analysis in this 
paper offers an alternative to that covert antiunion policy. It shows that it is possible to empower unions with an 
effective alternative by allowing them to bargain for non-wage benefits together with wage benefits. These non-
wage benefits are expected to have favorable effects on unemployment, the skill level of the labor force, and the 
national income. Instead of using politically unfavorable tax or welfare program, the government actually can 
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use these redistribution tools to encourage both the employers and the unions to use ‘non-wage benefits’ 
effectively in their bargaining strategy. That will help in avoiding an anti-union or anti-immigration 
environment. The first order condition can be written as F1(W2, θ; L, M) and F2(W2, θ; L, M). Totally 
differentiating the first order condition; 
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may take either sign. 
 
 
 
may take either sign. 
 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Dealing with international migration in the age of migration requires concrete solutions and alternative patterns. 
Hegel’s dialectic method might be applied to international migration for achieving syntheses and better 
outcomes. For instance, Hegel concluded that ‘all that is real is rational, and all that is rational is real.’17 As a 
rational, real and ideal pattern, hybrid model may help to control illegal migration with a proactive vision and 
transform mala fide migration to bona fide migration form. Interhybridity and indirect centralization will create 
more efficient and accurate policies and strategies, however for convergence among EU member states, hybrid 
structures ought to be created at EU supranational level with vertical relations. With indirect centralization 
within the confine of state’s control mechanism, authority and public sphere, these structures will have same 
legitimacy and effectiveness at the EU supranational level, and thus EU may improve its common migration and 
asylum policies in this way. Furthermore, empirical findings of the research have alarmed for the need of moral 
consciousness in migration turbulence through interhybridity mechanisms and good migration governance 
within the framework of hybrid model. The rise of forced migration and pushing factors prepared a ground for 
researchers to improve migrant-based approach with collection of migrants’ narratives. Empirical results are not 
just simple numbers, thus these should be investigated with migrants’ narratives analyses. 
Narratives of migrants in Western Balkan countries are lessons and recommendations for all migrants in the 
world. Openly, hybrid model is a platform in which people share their experiences, and therefore hybridity is 
likely to increase equal opportunity and active participation, enhance engagement of migrants to diaspora events 
and ethnic enclaves, maximize benefits and minimize negative effects, and enhance the humane of migration 
from a holistic perspective. Hybrid model will enhance communicative action among home, transit and host 
countries and develop mechanisms for these countries to facilitate the exchange of information, create ground 
for networking and ensure a communication platform. 
 
 19 
The role of the EU is to help Western Balkan countries to keep up realizing reforms in various areas. The 
Western Balkan counties’ migration flows to the EU can be decreased with the European Union stabilization 
and integration reforms, enlargement and neighborhood policy and the Stabilization Association Process. These 
reciprocal communication will balance the European Union relations with BRICs and eastern countries which 
have multi-dimensional (economic, politic, religious etc.) nexus with Western Balkan countries. Obviously, it 
can be claimed that partnership and solidarity with Western Balkan countries have significant influences for 
attainment of the EU 2020 targets and hence integration and stabilization of Western Balkan countries within 
the EU will be a driving force for the EU. With respect to EU 2020 targets, high skilled workers of these 
countries are seen as potentials or opportunities, whereas asylum seekers of these countries are seen as threats or 
potential problems. Therefore, the European Commission is working on how to attract high skilled labor 
migrants in order to balance the need of 20 million high skilled workers over next years. Both two hybrid case – 
i.e. the Heidelberg Intercultural Center and ASAN – are strategic models for European Commission to support 
such projects in order to attract high skilled labor migrants and improve employment policies. The convergence 
of the EU member states’ national interests is needed in order to increase the effectiveness of a common EU 
migration policy. Hopefully, non-state actors are ensuring various scientific routes for solving migration issues 
in different alternatives. The involvement of non-state actors to hybrid model will support capacity building and 
active networking. 
Moralization of migration matters is possible with creating hybrid structures and hybrid forms can provide 
definite solutions in various aspects and interhybridity can transform socially the migration process in favor of 
migrants and society as well as state and non-state actors. Dreaming a world without migrants in the age of 
migration is an utopia (or absolute spirit), however dreaming a world with engaged migrants within societies 
with minimum problems is not only rational but also real. 
To sum up, it is assumed that embedded-hybridity in migration research better can work in post-soviet bloc 
Western Balkan countries. The specific reasons for this are twofold. First, from governance perspective, the role 
of states and the existence of centralized power at the institutional structures of these states still exist. Second, 
people living in these two regions have hybrid identities and are more likely to be included in communicative 
action. Migrants with hybrid identities will protect their culture, national interests and values towards 
inhumanistic post-modern threats instead of serving as actors with dualistic interests in post-colonial era. 
Therefore, hybrid model is an effective strategy for social transformation of interhybridity. 
According to the mode of institutionalization, there are three types of governance; ‘governance by 
governments’, ‘governance with governments’ and ‘governance without governments’.18 
 
Table 3: Governance by/with/without Government(s) 
Type of 
Governance 
Mode of 
Institutionalization 
Norm Building 
Norm 
Implementing 
 
Governance by 
government(s) 
International/government
al cooperation 
Without self-
organization 
Via nation-states 
 
Governance with 
government(s) 
Global policy networks With self-organization With nation-states 
HYBRID 
MODEL 
Governance without 
government(s) 
Transnational network 
organizations 
Via self-organization Without nation-states 
 
Source: Mückenberger 2008: 27 
Table 3 illustrates the types of governance with comparing modes of institutionalization and how norms are 
built and implemented. At the level of governance by governments, states are presented by their own 
governments. The governments of states can create international global relations with other sovereign states or 
international organizations. This type of governance doesn’t let non-state actors to build norms and it exists only 
at nation-state level. Classical nation-state model exists and norms are built without self-organization. 
Governance with governments means among others also governments take place, however there are also non-
state actors. Equal participation of state actors and non-state actors creates hybrid structures in which these 
actors come together to deal with common issues and gain common objectives. Hybrid model is typically related 
to governance with governments because public actors, private actors and civil society actors share common 
interests and these interests are quite important in terms of reciprocal understanding. For state actors hybrid 
model means centralized authority of state that has an influence on private sector and civil society. For private 
actors hybrid model means creation of new markets and capacity building. For civil society hybrid model means 
having a mainstream role among state and private and transform interests in favor of the goodness of society. 
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The challenge is that non-state actors or sovereignty-free actors influence deeply the inter-state system’s 
monopoly of authority. Some commentators assessed a power shift from state to non-state actors, as 
sovereignty-free actors link up and operate across state borders as part of transnational networks. We can 
assume that the current transformation of governance for political concepts such as central authority, 
sovereignty, decentralization and democratic legitimacy is to balance the tendency towards theoretical 
complexity with the need for simplicity to avoid replicating the multidimensional and multicausal nature of 
current world politics. 
In the light of these considerations, hybrid model in migration research is a transition for social 
transformation and indirect centralization. As an illustration, migration and asylum issues acquire elements of 
multi-level governance and a theoretical dispersal of power away from the nation-state with the assigning 
policy-making capacity to Brussels. On the one hand, this gives to Brussels a central authority, on the other 
hand, this shift of power causes decentralization in nation state structure. Central power of Brussels’ governance 
ought to be effectively enhanced by legally binding verdicts to take illegal migrants and asylum seekers under 
the control of the EU institutions. Collaboration with post-communist institutions in Western Balkan states will 
enhance democracy level, rule of law and the prosperity for civil society. 
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Appendix I: Total Visa statistics 2009 
Schengen States Schengen visas 
(Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay 
visas) 
Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued 
Number of visas 
issued 
Non issuance rate 
AT 285.196 5,23% 27.169 
BE 165.474 17,38% 24.588 
CH 351.578 8,70% 37.975 
CZ 440.360 3,74% 17.109 
DE 1.491.784 9,06% 139.640 
DK 77.142 5,40% 1.037 
EE 93.464 2,49% 399 
EL 598.883 4,68% 40.686 
ES 748.466 9,97% 135.568 
FI 783.340 1,58% - 
FR 1.415.886 12,35% 167.108 
HU 272.972 4,14% 8.530 
IS 779 4,18% 88 
IT 1.053.354 5,02% 155.286 
LT 236.299 1,77% 2.824 
LU 5.364 2,38% 27 
LV 118.436 3,48% 1.450 
MT 28.915 9,31% 4.168 
NL 313.534 7,37% 9.032 
NO 105.430 0,75% 16.502 
PL 579.424 3,29% 210.292 
PT 107.224 6,87% 15.800 
SE 172.595 7,62% 527 
SI 97.690 4,19% 391 
SK 62.287 3,78% 1.982 
UE Member States 
not 
applying yet fully the 
Schengen acquis 
Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay 
visas 
Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued Number of visas 
issued 
Non issuance rate 
BG 595.914 1,05% 8.575 
CY 113.205 2,63% - 
RO 175.956 3,24% 12.831 
Totals Airport transit visas, transit visas, short-stay 
visas 
Number of national 
long-stay visas 
issued Number of visas 
issued 
Non issuance rate 
Sub-total Schengen 9.605.876 7,11% 1.018.178 
Sub-total non 
Schengen 
885.075 1,70% 21.406 
Total 10.490.951 6,68% 1.039.584 
Source: European Commission 2011: 21 
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Appendix II: Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2000-2010 Migration Data 
and 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) According to World Bank Data 
Albania            
Indicator Name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
17.45868           
Net migration -270245     -72243     -47889 Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
523 292 17 26 51 56 56 77 65 70 76 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
6802 7626 10761 10385 10478 12722 14079 15340 15006 15711 14772 
International migrant stock, 
total 
76695     82668     89106 
International migrant stock 
(% of population) 
2.496699     2.631231     2.780839651 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of 
individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 89106 
Host Country: 1438451 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Greece, Italy, Germany, the UK and France 1438.3 thousands, 45.4% 
of total population (2.83 
million, Instat 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 53.1% 89.1 thousands, 2.8% of 
total population 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
20.30026           
Net migration 281795     61825     -10000 Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
38152 32745 28022 22517 22215 10568 10318 7367 7257 7132 7016 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
474981 447321 406326 300006 228815 109930 199946 78273 74366 70018 63004 
International migrant stock, 
total 
96001     35141     27780 
International migrant stock 
(% of population) 
2.599048     0.92941     0.73880051 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of 
individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 27780 
Host Country: 1460639 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Sweden and Italy 1461.0 thousands, 
38.9% of total population 
(3.8 million, 2011) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 50.3% 27.8 thousands, 0.7% of 
total population 
Kosovo** **World Bank migration data are not available for the Republic of Kosovo. However, total number of bilateral 
migrant stocks for host country is; 25251 and top destination countries are; Germany, Italy, Austria and the UK. 
According to UNDP Kosovo Remittance Study 2010 the total amount of remittances received in 2009 was €442.7 
million, 11% of the overall GDP in year 2009. 
Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
29.38359           
Net migration -9000     -4000     2000 Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
9050 4363 2816 193 1004 1274 1240 1235 1672 1542 1398 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
2176 12197 8072 5982 5104 8600 7940 8077 7521 7926 7889 
International migrant stock, 
total 
125665     120288     129701 
International migrant stock 
(% of population) 
6.254819     5.901941     6.294444771 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of 
individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 129701  
Host Country: 447137  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Italy, Germany, Austria, Slovenia and France 447.1 thousand, 21.9% of 
total population (2 million, 
2010) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 58.3% 129.7 thousands, 6.3% of 
total population 
Montenegro 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
           
Net migration -32450     -20632     -2508 Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum       
6926 8528 24741 24019 16364 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin       
135 557 1283 2582 3246 
International migrant stock, 
total      
54583     42509 
International migrant stock 
(% of population)      
8.709048     6.731539692 
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Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of 
individual countries) to the UN  
Home Country: 42509 
Host Country: 36 
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Denmark and Hungary 0.0 thousands 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 61.5% 42.5 thousands, 6.8% of 
total population (0.63 
million, 2010) 
Serbia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Emigration rate of tertiary 
educated (% of total tertiary 
educated population) 
           
Net migration -147889     -338544     0 Refugee population by 
country or territory of asylum 
484391 400304 354402 291403 276683 148264 98997 97995 96739 86351 73608 
Refugee population by 
country or territory of origin 
146748 144231 323335 296632 237032 189989 174027 165643 185935 195626 183289 
International migrant stock, 
total 
856763     674612     525388 
International migrant stock 
(% of population) 
11.39866     9.066428     7.204424665 
Bilateral Estimates of Migrant 
Stocks in 2010* 
Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks (from population censuses of 
individual countries) to the UN 
Home Country: 525388  
Host Country: 130844  
Stock of emigrants in 2010 Top destination EU countries: Austria, France and Denmark 196.0 thousands, 2.0% of 
total population (7.3 
million, 2009) 
Stock of immigrants in 2010 Females as percentage of immigrants: 56.7% 525.4 thousands, 5.3% of 
total population 
Comparison of the Western Balkan Countries' 2003-2010 Remittances (millions of US$) 
Albania 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 598 699 734 889 1161 1290 1359 1468 1495 1317 1285 
Workers' remittances 531 615 643 778 1028 1161 1176 1305 1226 1090  
Compensation of employees 67 84 90 111 132 129 184 163 270 227  
Migrants' transfer            
Outward remittance flows    4 5 7 27 10 16 10  
Workers' remittances    0 0  0     
Compensation of employees    4 5 7 27 10 16 9  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.9 bn, net ODA received US$0.4 bn, total international reserves US$2.4 bn, exports of goods and 
services US$3.8 bn in 2008. 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 1595 1521 1526 1749 2072 2043 2157 2700 2735 2167 2228 
Workers' remittances 950 919 956 1143 1474 1467 1589 1947 1899 1432  
Compensation of employees 631 581 540 595 579 570 560 739 828 643  
Migrants' transfer 26 25 30 11 19 5 8 13 8 6  
Outward remittance flows 2 11 14 20 62 40 55 65 70 61  
Workers' remittances  5 7 10 49 28 41 50 53 46  
Compensation of employees 2 6 7 11 13 12 14 15 17 15  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$1.1 bn, net ODA received US$0.5 bn, total international reserves US$3.5 bn, exports of goods and 
services US$6.8 bn in 2008. 
Kosovo** Remittance data are currently not available for Kosovo.  
Macedonia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 81 73 106 174 213 227 267 345 407 401 414 
Workers' remittances 80 68 92 146 161 169 198 239 266 260  
Compensation of employees 0 5 14 28 52 57 69 106 140 121  
Migrants' transfer            
Outward remittance flows 14 21 23 16 16 16 18 25 33 26  
Workers' remittances 14 21 23 15 15 14 16 22 28 22  
Compensation of employees   1 1 1 2 2 3 5 4  
Migrants' transfer            
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$0.6 bn, net ODA received US$0.2 bn, total international reserves US$2.1 bn, exports of goods and 
services US$5.0 bn in 2008. 
Montenegro Remittance data are currently not available for Montenegro.  
Serbia 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
(estimate) 
Inward remittance flows 1132* 1698* 2089* 2661 4129 4650 4703 5377 5538 5406 558 
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Workers' remittances        2948 2913 3755  
Compensation of employees        148 191 184  
Migrants' transfer        2 2 3  
Outward remittance flows        114 138 91  
Workers' remittances        95 114 70  
Compensation of employees        17 23 20  
Migrants' transfer        2 1 1  
For comparison: net FDI inflows US$3.0 bn, net ODA received US$1.0 bn, total international reserves US$11.5 bn, exports of goods and 
services US$14.8 bn in 2008. 
*Serbia and Montenegro 
Source: The World Bank 2008; The World Bank 2011 
 
 
Appendix III: Comparison of the European Union Pre-accession Assistance for the 
Western Balkan Countries 
Albania 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 56.52 38.66 15% 
Public Administration Reform 43.15 38.66 15% 
Transport 49.06 51.55 20% 
Environment and Climate Change 80.12 51.55 20% 
Social Development 13.40 25.77 10% 
Rural Development/Agriculture 17.20 51.55 20% 
TOTAL 259.45 257.74 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 84.30 85.99 87.45 
Cross-border Cooperation 10.13 10.28 10.67 
TOTAL 94.43 96.27 98.12 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 38.64 55.00 17.5 % 
Public Administration Reform 51.55 40.00 12.7 % 
Private Sector Development 28.10 50.00 15.9 % 
Transport 22.30 35.00 11.1 % 
Environment and Climate Change 72.70 54.22 17.3 % 
Social Development 46.75 40.00 12.7 % 
Acquis related and other Actions 52.54 40.00 12.7 % 
TOTAL 312.58 314.22 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 102.68 104.67 106.87 
Cross-border Cooperation 4.75 4.80 4.94 
TOTAL 107.43 109.47 111.81 
Kosovo 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 78.50 (18.46%) 61.09 30 % 
Private Sector Development 192.93 (45.38 %) 97.75 48 % 
Public Administration Reform 106.22 (24.98%) 20.35 10 % 
Other 47.55 (11.18%) 24.42 12 % 
TOTAL 425.20 203.61 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 65.83 67.07 70.71 
Cross-border Cooperation 2.87 2.93 2.99 
TOTAL 68.70 70.00 73.70 
Macedonia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Public Administration Reform 28.00 21.33 7 % 
Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights 44.00 24.38 8 % 
Private Sector Development 45.50 45.71 15% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 46.40 67.04 22 % 
Transport 52.50 60.95 20% 
Environment and Climate Change 28.30 54.85 18% 
Social Development 37.30 30.47 10% 
TOTAL 282.00 304.76 100% 
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IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 28.80 28.20 27.94 
Cross-border Cooperation 5.12 5.18 5.24 
Regional Development 39.30 42.30 51.80 
Human Resources Development 8.80 10.38 11.20 
Rural Development 16.00 19.00 21.03 
TOTAL 98.02 105.07 117.21 
Montenegro 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 17.85 7.30 8% 
Public Administration 21.65 10.04 11% 
Environment and Climate Change 14.80 22.82 25% 
Transport 16.20 18.26 20% 
Social development 8.63 9.13 10% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 8.10 14.60 16% 
Ad hoc measures 8.11 9.13 10% 
TOTAL 106.54 91.28 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 29843599 21585429 49.05% 
Cross-border Cooperation 4310344 9257238 12.94% 
Regional Development 0 23200000 22.13% 
Social Development 0 5757077 5.49% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 0 10900000 10.40% 
TOTAL 34153943 70699744 100.00% 
Serbia 
Indicative Financial Allocation per Sector (€ million) 
2011-2013 Period 2007 - 2010 Period 2011 - 2013 
Justice and Home Affairs 42.00 75.00 12% 
Public Administration Reform 89.00 75.00 12% 
Social Development 96.00 75.00 12% 
Private Sector Development 34.00 75.00 12% 
Transport 71.00 75.00 12% 
Environment, Climate Change and Energy 93.00 99.00 16% 
Agriculture and Rural Development 34.00 75.00 12% 
Other EU Acquis and Horizontal Activities 120.00 75.00 12% 
TOTAL 579.00 624.00 100% 
IPA Component 2011 2012 2013 
Transition Assistance and Institution Building 190.00 194.00 203.00 
Cross-border Cooperation 12.00 12.00 12.00 
TOTAL 202.00 206.00 215.00 
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Appendix IV: Output of SPSS Data Analyses (Democracy and Institutions) 
 
 
1. General variables 
Country:    country name 
Countryn:   country code: Albania 1; Bosnia and Herzegovina 2; Kosovo 3; Macedonia (FYR) 4; Montenegro 5; Serbia 6. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  N % 
Cases Valid 52 86,7 
Excluded(a) 8 13,3 
Total 60 100,0 
a  Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure. 
 
Reliability Statistics 
Cronbach's Alpha 
Cronbach's Alpha Based on 
Standardized Items N of Items 
,922 ,947 4 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. ,819 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 315,262 
df 10 
Sig. ,000 
Item Statistics Mean 
Std. 
Deviation N 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication 
"Freedom in the World" 
3,5769 1,07277 52 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 
dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance 
3,9660 ,56013 52 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two 
dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
4,6996 ,56573 52 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication 
"Freedom in the World" 
3,1923 ,88647 52 
  
Summary Item Statistics 
  Mean Minimum Maximum Range 
Maximum / 
Minimum Variance N of Items 
Item Means 3,859 3,192 4,700 1,507 1,472 ,414 4 
Item Variances ,643 ,314 1,151 ,837 3,668 ,164 4 
Inter-Item Covariances ,480 ,246 ,848 ,601 3,440 ,038 4 
Inter-Item Correlations ,816 ,749 ,896 ,147 1,196 ,004 4 
Scale Statistics 
Mean Variance Std. Deviation N of Items 
15,4348 8,327 2,88567 4 
 
ANOVA with Friedman's Test 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square 
Friedman's Chi-
Square Sig 
Between People 106,171 51 2,082     
Within People Between Items 64,590(a) 3 21,530 112,567 ,000 
Residual 24,922 153 ,163     
Total 89,512 156 ,574     
Total 195,683 207 ,945     
Grand Mean = 3,8587 
a  Kendall's coefficient of concordance W = ,330. 
 
Hotelling's T-Squared Test 
Hotelling's T-
Squared F df1 df2 Sig 
415,862 133,185 3 49 ,000 
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Intraclass Correlation Coefficient 
  
Intraclass 
Correlation(a) 95% Confidence Interval F Test with True Value 0 
Lower Bound Upper Bound Value df1 df2 Sig Lower Bound 
Single Measures ,747(b) ,647 ,831 12,780 51,0 153 ,000 
Average Measures ,922(c) ,880 ,951 12,780 51,0 153 ,000 
Two-way mixed effects model where people effects are random and measures effects are fixed. 
a  Type C intraclass correlation coefficients using a consistency definition-the between-measure variance is excluded from the denominator 
variance. 
b  The estimator is the same, whether the interaction effect is present or not. 
c  This estimate is computed assuming the interaction effect is absent, because it is not estimable otherwise. 
 
Correlations 
   
rating of 
Political Rights 
as calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated as 
the average of scores 
obtained on 4 
dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule 
of Law score is 
calculated as the average 
of ratings obtained on 
two dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and 
Corruption 
rating of Political Rights as 
calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the 
World" 
Pearson Correlation 
1 ,927(**) ,911(**) ,830(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   ,000 ,000 ,000 
  N 112 112 70 70 
rating of Civil Liberties as 
calculated by Freedom House and 
reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the 
World" 
Pearson Correlation 
,927(**) 1 ,848(**) ,788(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000   ,000 ,000 
  N 112 112 70 70 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores 
obtained on 4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media and 
Governance 
Pearson Correlation 
,911(**) ,848(**) 1 ,913(**) 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   ,000 
  N 70 70 78 78 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law 
score is calculated as the average 
of ratings obtained on two 
dimensions: Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and Corruption 
Pearson Correlation 
,830(**) ,788(**) ,913(**) 1 
  Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000   
  N 70 70 78 78 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Each country and territory is awarded from 0 to 4 raw points for each of 10 questions grouped into three 
subcategories in a political rights checklist (A. Electoral Process, B. Political Pluralism and Participation and C. Functioning 
of Government) and for each of 15 questions grouped into four subcategories in a civil liberties checklist (A. Freedom of 
Expression and Belief, B. Associational and Organizational Rights, C. Rule of Law and D. Personal Autonomy and 
Individual Rights). A country or territory is assigned a numerical rating on a scale of 1 to 7 based on the total number of raw 
points awarded to the political rights and civil liberties checklist questions. For both checklists, 1 represents the most free 
and 7 the least free; each 1 to 7 rating corresponds to a range of total raw scores. Each pair of political rights and civil 
liberties ratings is averaged to determine an overall status of “Free,” “Partly Free,” or “Not Free.” Those whose ratings 
average 1-2.5 are considered Free, 3-5.5 Partly Free, and 5.5-7 Not Free. The dividing line between Partly Free and Not Free 
falls at 5.5. For example, countries that receive a rating of 6 for political rights and 5 for civil liberties, or a 5 for political 
rights and a 6 for civil liberties, could be either Partly Free or Not Free. The total number of raw points is the definitive 
factor that determines the final status. Countries and territories with combined raw scores of 0-33 points are Not Free, 34-67 
points are Partly Free, and 68-100 are Free. 
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Item Statistics 
 
  Mean Std. Deviation N 
bicameral or unicameral 
parliament, as defined in the 
country's constitution. 
,69 1,423 484 
form of state organization as 
defined by constitution -,36 ,823 484 
electoral system for the (lower 
chamber of the) Parliament (see 
Annex Electoral Systems) 1,00 1,859 484 
index of rigidity of constitution 
(Lijphart 1999: 216-223) (see 
Annex Flexibility of 
Constitutions) 1,86 2,016 484 
ANOVA 
  
Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig 
Between People 3772,988 483 7,812     
Within People Between Items 1222,228 3 407,409 506,961 ,000 
Residual 1164,460 1449 ,804     
Total 2386,687 1452 1,644     
Total 6159,675 1935 3,183     
Grand Mean = ,80 
 
Correlations 
    
bicameral or 
unicameral 
parliament, as 
defined in the 
country's 
constitution. 
form of state 
organization as 
defined by 
constitution 
electoral system 
for the (lower 
chamber of the) 
Parliament (see 
Annex Electoral 
Systems) 
index of rigidity of 
constitution 
(Lijphart 1999: 
216-223) (see 
Annex Flexibility 
of Constitutions) 
bicameral or unicameral 
parliament, as defined in the 
country's constitution. 
Pearson Correlation 1 ,925(**) ,657(**) ,844(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed)   ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 486 486 484 486 
form of state organization as 
defined by constitution 
Pearson Correlation ,925(**) 1 ,703(**) ,891(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000   ,000 ,000 
N 486 502 484 486 
electoral system for the (lower 
chamber of the) Parliament (see 
Annex Electoral Systems) 
Pearson Correlation ,657(**) ,703(**) 1 ,724(**) 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000   ,000 
N 
484 484 484 484 
index of rigidity of constitution 
(Lijphart 1999: 216-223) (see 
Annex Flexibility of 
Constitutions) 
Pearson Correlation ,844(**) ,891(**) ,724(**) 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000   
N 486 486 484 486 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Inter-Item Correlation Matrix 
  
rating of 
Political Rights 
as calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated as 
the average of scores 
obtained on 4 
dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule 
of Law score is 
calculated as the average 
of ratings obtained on 
two dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and 
Corruption 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World"  
rating of Political Rights as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
1,000 ,896 ,770 ,891 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores obtained on 
4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media and Governance 
,896 1,000 ,778 ,811 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is 
calculated as the average of ratings obtained on 
two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and 
Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,770 ,778 1,000 ,749 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
,891 ,811 ,749 1,000 
 
Inter-Item Covariance Matrix 
  
rating of 
Political Rights 
as calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated as 
the average of scores 
obtained on 4 
dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Nations in Transit - Rule 
of Law score is 
calculated as the average 
of ratings obtained on 
two dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and Judicial 
Framework and 
Corruption 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
1,151 ,538 ,467 ,848 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores obtained on 
4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media and Governance 
,538 ,314 ,246 ,403 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is 
calculated as the average of ratings obtained on 
two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and 
Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,467 ,246 ,320 ,376 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by 
Freedom House and reported annually in the 
publication "Freedom in the World" 
,848 ,403 ,376 ,786 
 
Communalities 
  Initial Extraction 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom 
in the World" 
1,000 ,925 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom 
in the World" 
1,000 ,871 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: 
Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework and Corruption 
1,000 ,870 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media and Governance 
1,000 ,942 
  Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 3,609 90,215 90,215 3,609 90,215 90,215 
2 ,251 6,279 96,494       
3 ,093 2,313 98,807       
4 ,048 1,193 100,000       
  Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Component Matrix(a) 
  Component 
  1 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" ,962 
rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication "Freedom in the World" ,933 
Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative and 
Judicial Framework and Corruption 
,933 
Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media and Governance 
,971 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  1 components extracted. 
 
Reproduced Correlations 
    
rating of Political 
Rights as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
rating of Civil 
Liberties as 
calculated by 
Freedom House 
and reported 
annually in the 
publication 
"Freedom in the 
World" 
Nations in Transit - 
Rule of Law score 
is calculated as the 
average of ratings 
obtained on two 
dimensions: 
Constitutional, 
Legislative and 
Judicial 
Framework and 
Corruption 
Nations in Transit - 
Democratization 
score is calculated 
as the average of 
scores obtained on 
4 dimensions: 
Electoral Process, 
Civil Society, 
Independent Media 
and Governance 
Reproduced 
Correlation 
rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom 
House and reported annually in the publication 
"Freedom in the World" 
,925(b) ,898 ,897 ,934 
  rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom 
House and reported annually in the publication 
"Freedom in the World" 
,898 ,871(b) ,871 ,906 
  Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as 
the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: 
Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework 
and Corruption 
,897 ,871 ,870(b) ,905 
  Nations in Transit - Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 
dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media and Governance 
,934 ,906 ,905 ,942(b) 
Residual(a) rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom 
House and reported annually in the publication 
"Freedom in the World" 
  ,013 -,067 -,023 
  rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom 
House and reported annually in the publication 
"Freedom in the World" 
,013   -,083 -,058 
  Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as 
the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: 
Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework 
and Corruption 
-,067 -,083   ,021 
  Nations in Transit - Democratization score is 
calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 
dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media and Governance 
-,023 -,058 ,021   
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  Residuals are computed between observed and reproduced correlations. There are 3 (50,0%) nonredundant residuals with absolute values 
greater than 0.05. 
b  Reproduced communalities 
Rotated Component Matrix(a) 
a  Only one component was extracted. The solution cannot be rotated. 
 
1. Institutions 
 
bicam  bicameral or unicameral parliament, as defined in the country’s constitution.  
codes: 1 - unicameral parliament; 2 - bicameral parliament; -2 – communist constitution 
subordup subordinated upper chamber: relationship between the lower and upper chamber, as framed by the post-communist constitutions.  
codes: 1 – upper chamber is subordinated; 0 - upper chamber is not subordinated; -1 – unicameral parliament; -2 – communist 
constitution or undemocratic rule 
electup  mode of election of upper chamber 
codes: 1 – appointment/delegation; 2 – indirect by regional/state legislature; 3 – directly by the people; 4 – other; -1 – unicameral 
Parliament; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
federal  form of state organization as defined by constitution 
 codes: 1 – federal state; 0 – other; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
judrev judicial review – existence of an independent body which decides whether laws are in conformity with the constitution 
codes: 1 – yes ; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or undemocratic rule 
electsys electoral system for the (lower chamber of the) Parliament 
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codes: 0 – proportional representation; 1 – proportional representation modified; 2 – majoritarian; 3 – parallel (the chamber is elected 
using both majoritarian and proportional representation systems, and each is allocated a   fixed number of seats); -2 – communist 
election rule 
cab_type type of cabinet  
 codes: 1 - single party majority; 2 - minimal winning; 3 - surplus coalition; 4 - single party minority; 5 - minority coalition; 6 -
caretaker; 7 - grand coalition 
n/p – non-party ministers or experts; na – presidential cabinets (cabinets at the formation of which the Parliament composition is not 
taken into account) 
Irid index of rigidity of constitution 
 codes: 1- ordinary majorities; 2 – more than ordinary but less than two-thirds majorities plus referendum; 3 - two-thirds majorities and 
equivalent; 4 - supermajorities (greater than two-thirds). If particularly difficult conditions for amending the constitution existed, an 
intermediary category was created by adding .5 to the code describing the basic conditions. 
Req_rev required referendum 
  codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Vp_ref veto point referendum 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Pop_veto popular veto 
 codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other 
Pop_init popular initiative 
 codes: 1- yes; 0 – no; -2 – communist constitution or other  
Topics of referenda:  
refers to the issues on which referenda are required or can be organized 
based on post-communist constitutions 
Topic 1 border issues and association/secession issues; delegation of state powers to international organizations 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
Topic2 adoption of and amendments to constitution; adoption of and change in other laws 
codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
Topic3 dissolution of Parliament; impeachment 
 codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
Topic4 other issues "of national importance" 
 codes: 1- yes; 0 – no;  -2 – communist constitution 
polsys political system 
 codes: 0 – parliamentary; 1 – presidential; 2 – semi-presidential, dominated by president; 3 – semi-presidential, dominated by 
parliament; 4 – other 
ppi  presidential power index 
 -2 - communist constitutions 
 
2. Democracy 
 
independ year of acquisition of independence (for NIS) or official end of communist rule (for CEE) 
 codes: 0 – communist rule; 1 - independent or non-communist 
FH overall status of a country 
 codes: 0 – not free; 1 - partly free; 2 – free;  
“.” missing value – data does not exist 
FH_PR rating of Political Rights as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”  
FH_CL rating of Civil Liberties as calculated by Freedom House and reported annually in the publication “Freedom in the World”  
NiT_DEM Nations in Transit - Democratization score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 4 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil 
Society, Independent Media and Governance (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_ROL Nations in Transit - Rule of Law score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on two dimensions: Constitutional, Legislative 
and Judicial Framework and Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_EC Nations in Transit - Economic Liberalization score is calculated as the average of ratings obtained on three dimensions: Privatization, 
Macroeconomic Policy and Microeconomic Policy (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_DEM2 Nations in Transit - Democracy score is calculated as the average of scores obtained on 7 dimensions: Electoral Process, Civil Society, 
Independent Media, National Democratic Governance, Local Democratic Governance, Judicial Framework and Independence and 
Corruption (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_EP Nations in Transit – Electoral process score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_CS Nations in Transit – Civil society score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_Media Nations in Transit – Independent media score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_GOV Nations in Transit – Governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_NGov Nations in Transit – National democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputed as of 2004) 
NiT_LGov Nations in Transit – Local democratic governance score (1 highest, 7 lowest); was introduced in 2005 edition (inputed as of 2004) 
NiT_JUD Nations in Transit – Judicial Framework and Independence score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
NiT_COR Nations in Transit – Corruption score (1 highest, 7 lowest) 
freedom1 rating of press freedom  
codes: 0 - not free; 1 - partly free; 2 - free; 
   “.” missing value – data does not exist 
freedom2 rating of press freedom scores. Data is available only from 1994 onward. 
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
CPI Corruption Perception Index. CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country 
analysts, and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). 
codes: table entries are CPI values.  
“.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
source: Transparency International. 
war violent conflict inside the country or at the borders. 
  codes: 0 – no violent conflict; 1 – war, civil war or turmoil; 2 – ceasefire 
   “.” indicates a missing value – data does not exist 
 
